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Abstract 
Using data from 2018, a number of studies have found that recent U.S tariffs have been passed on 
entirely to U.S. importers and consumers. These results are surprising given that trade theory has long 
stressed that tariffs applied by a large country should drive down foreign prices. Using another year of 
data including significant escalations in the trade war, we find that U.S. tariffs continue to be almost 
entirely borne by U.S. firms and consumers. We show that the response of import values to the tariffs 
increases in absolute magnitude over time, consistent with the idea that it takes time for firms to 
reorganize supply chains. We find heterogeneity in the responses of some sectors, such as steel, where 
tariffs have caused foreign exporters to drop their prices substantially, enabling them to export 
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1 Introduction
Using data from 2018, a number of studies have found that recent U.S taris have been passed on entirely to
U.S. importers and consumers.1 These results are surprising given that trade theory has long stressed that
taris applied by a large country should drive down foreign prices. With almost another year of data and
signicant escalations in the trade war, one might wonder whether it continues to be true that terms-of-trade
eects are absent or whether we can see evidence that in certain industries at least, the costs of the taris
are now being paid by foreign rms. One might see terms-of-trade eects appear for a number of reasons.
For example, U.S. taris might cause foreign export prices to fall after a lag because long-term contracts or
other factors render prices sticky. In this case, the initial results might not well describe the current situation.
Alternatively, there might be important changes in how imports respond to taris because the passage of
time may enable rms to more easily avoid taris by shifting production to Vietnam and other countries that
were not targeted.
In this paper, we explore these issues and nd that adding data for most of 2019 does not alter the main
conclusions of earlier studies. U.S. taris continue to be almost entirely borne by U.S. rms and consumers.
Similarly, we also nd that the substantial redirection of trade in response to the 2018 taris has accelerated.
Among goods that continue to be imported, a 10 percent tari is associated with about a 10 percent drop
in imports for the rst three months, but this elasticity doubles in magnitude in subsequent months. These
higher long-run elasticities suggest that the 2018 taris—many of which were applied in October—are only
now having their full impact on U.S. import volumes.
Interestingly, we do nd evidence of signicant dierences in behavior across sectors. The data show
that U.S. taris have caused foreign exporters of steel to substantially lower their prices into the U.S. market.
Thus, foreign countries are bearing close to half the cost of the steel taris. Since China is only the tenth
largest steel supplier to the U.S. market, these costs have largely been borne by regions like the EU, South
Korea and Japan.2 This is likely good news for U.S. rms that demand steel, but bad news for workers hoping
that steel taris will bring back jobs. Indeed, the fact that foreign steel producers have lowered their prices in
response to U.S. taris may help explain why U.S. steel production only rose by 2 percent per year between
the third quarter of 2017 and the third quarter of 2019 despite 25 percent steel taris.3
2 Data and Background
As Figure 1 shows, the trade war resulted in a tripling of the average U.S. duty on imports—rising from 1.6 to
5.4 percent—with much of the increase coming after July 2018 as the U.S. applied taris of 10 to 25 percent
on $362 billion of imports from China. The types of goods protected by taris have also expanded over time.
The rst ve waves hit mostly capital goods and intermediate inputs, but the last three waves have included
$126 billion of consumer goods.
1See, Amiti, Redding and Weinstein (2019), Fajgelbaum et al. (2020), Flaaen, Hortaçsu and Tintelnot (2019), and Cavallo et al.
(2019).
2The steel taris on Canada and Mexico were lifted on May 19, 2019.
3Data from https://fred.stlouisfed.org
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In order to understand how these taris have aected U.S. prices and import values, we make use of U.S.
customs data through October 2019, which reports the foreign export values and quantities at the 10-digit
level of harmonized tari system (HTS10). These data break up monthly U.S. imports from each country into
approximately 16,000 narrowly dened categories. Dividing the import values by the quantities, we compute
unit values for each source country and 10-digit product. Importantly, these unit values are computed before
taris are applied, so they correspond to foreign export prices. Multiplying these unit values by the duty rates
from the U.S. International Trade Commission, we compute the tari-inclusive import prices that we use in
our regressions. We drop petroleum imports, because of the sensitivity of oil import values to uctuations in
oil prices, which add a lot of noise. To explore heterogeneity across dierent categories of goods, we separate
HTS10 products into the three end-use categories of capital goods, consumer goods and intermediate inputs,
according to the U.S. Census Bureau classication. We also further subdivide intermediate inputs into steel
and non-steel inputs.
3 Empirical Specication
We use an event-study specication to examine the impact of the taris on U.S. import values and prices
computed at the source country (i), HTS10 product (j), month (t) level. We pool all waves and dene the
treatment month zero as the month before a tari is imposed. We measure the log change in taris between
month s and the last untreated month (ln[(1 + τijs)/(1 + τij0)]). We regress log import prices or values
(ln xijt) on interactions between treatment month indicator variables (Iijs) and this log change in taris:











+ δjt + µit + uijt, (1)
where the excluded category is the the last untreated month (i.e., β0 = 0). We include country-time xed
eects (µit) to control for time-varying factors that aect the prices or values of exports (e.g., exchange rates).
The HTS10-time xed eects (δjt) allow for time-varying forces that aect a product’s exports in all countries
(e.g. common technological change). The country-product xed eects (ηij) control for the level of import
values or prices in the last untreated month and capture dierences in quality or comparative advantage
across countries and products.
This specication has a “dierence-in-dierences” interpretation, in which the rst dierence is between
treated and untreated product-countries, and the second dierence is before and after the taris are applied.
Since both the dependent variable and the right-hand side tari variable are measured in logs, the coecients
βs are elasticities estimated over dierent time horizons, s. Many taris are dened at the level of HS8 tari
lines. Hence, we cluster the standard errors at the HS8 level, which allows the regression error (uijt) to be
correlated over time, and across HTS10 products within each HS8 tari line.
We estimate this regression separately for each end-use category and for a pooled specication including
all end-use categories. Figure 2 shows the estimated elasticities for tari-inclusive import prices by month
for the rst 12 months before and after the treatment, where observations with treatment periods longer
than 12 months are combined into the nal 12-month category. As is apparent from the gure, we nd
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little evidence of pre-trends, with the estimated coecients for the months before the treatment statistically
indistinguishable from zero in most months. After the taris are applied, we see that tari passthrough (βs),
which is a little below one in the rst few months after the taris were applied, becomes indistinguishable
from one about four months after being levied. In other words, approximately 100 percent of these import
taxes have been passed on to U.S. importers and consumers.
This result masks some important heterogeneity. Taris on steel inputs show the opposite pattern: an
initial passthrough of close to 100 percent to steel buyers falls to around 50 percent a year after the tari was
applied. These results suggest that the steel taris have a much smaller capacity to protect steel workers than
other taris. By contrast, we nd that for consumer and non-steel inputs, complete tari passthrough was
immediate and then rose above 100 percent (although typically not signicantly).
One reason why we may not be identifying terms-of-trade eects in industries other than steel is that
general equilibrium eects that are common across all products for each country-year observation are ab-
sorbed into the country-year xed eects. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that the prices charged by
Chinese exporters for goods exported to the U.S. market have not fallen substantially. Between October 2017
and October 2019, the U.S. import price index for all imports from China fell by 1.4 percent, much less than
the terms-of-trade eects one might expect given the 25 percent taris applied to Chinese imports. This drop
is comparable to the 0.7 percent drop for all U.S. non-petroleum imports over the same period. Thus, even if
there are important general equilibrium forces at work, they have not been sucient to yield a substantial
overall drop in the prices (net of other factors) charged by Chinese exporters in the U.S.4
Although the taris do not appear to be aecting foreign export prices, they are having a sizable impact
on U.S. import volumes. In Figure 3, we report the corresponding elasticities for import values. Again, we
nd little evidence of pre-trends, with the estimated coecients for months before the treatment close to
zero and typically statistically insignicant. Here, however, we nd large negative and statistically signicant
estimated coecients for months after the treatment, with elasticities ranging up to between 4 and 5 for some
categories of goods.5 Interestingly, these estimated elasticities increase in magnitude over time, consistent
with increasing redirection of imports as the trade war continues. The fact that the elasticity of imports with
respect to taris doubles on average a year after a tari is applied reects the fact that it takes some time for
rms to reorganize their supply chains so that they can avoid the taris. The one exception, again, is steel,
where foreign rms absorbed much of the tari cost and as a result the value of steel imports fell much less
than in other sectors.
4 Conclusions
Trade theory suggests that taris levied by a large country, such as the U.S., should cause foreign rms to lower
prices. However, until the 2018 trade war, economists have not had the opportunity to study taris on large
4Data from https://fred.stlouisfed.org
5As this specication uses the log of import values, only country-products with positive import values are included in the regres-
sion sample. In Amiti, Redding and Weinstein (2019), we nd that a substantial component of the response to the U.S. import taris
came via a change in source of supply with import values falling from positive to zero values, suggesting that the overall import
value elasticities could be even larger once these zeros are taken into account.
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economies in recent history due to the reluctance of governments in these economies to apply substantial
taris. Thus, economists were forced to assess the impact of taris based on estimates of export supply
curves obtained from non-tari data and as well as evidence of incomplete pass-through of exchange rates.
(e.g., Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings (2014), Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings (2019), Broda, Limão and Weinstein
(2008) and Goldberg and Knetter (1997)). The recent U.S. application of substantial taris on imports from
major trading partners provides a natural experiment for understanding these eects. Quite surprisingly, we
have found that in most sectors, these U.S. taris have been completely passed on to U.S. rms and consumers.
Moreover, the reorganization of supply chains has increased with time. Interestingly, there is also substantial
heterogeneity in the responses of some sectors, such as steel, where taris caused foreign exporters to drop
their prices substantially enabling them to export relatively more than in sectors where tari passthrough
was complete.
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Figure 1: Average U.S. Taris by Wave of the 2018-2019 Trade War
Notes: Authors calculations based on data from the US Census Bureau; US Trade Representative (USTR); US International Trade Commission. Taris
on the 10-digit Harmonized Tari Schedule (HTS) product code by country, weighted by 2017 annual import value. Dashed vertical lines indicate the
implementation of each of the eight major waves of new taris during 2018-2019; taris implemented after the 15th of the month counted for the
subsequent month. Four tranches of taris were imposed on China, designated by 1, 2, 3, and 4. Import values associated with each line correspond
to headline numbers, not 2017 values, which are a little lower.
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Notes: Authors calculations based on data from the US Census Bureau; US Trade Representative (USTR); US International Trade Commission. Points
correspond to the elasticities of the tari-inclusive import price with respect to taris (βs) obtained from estimating equation (1).
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